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Abstract
We develop an optimal theory of intergovernmental transfers and a simulation analy-
sis that provides estimates of the optimal shares of resources to be allocated to state
governments in Mexico. Our models provide several insights: First, the best fit of our
model to observed data suggests that the best predictor of the share of intergovern-
mental transfers to states is the density of population in Mexico. Second, our analysis
provides recommendations of economic policy design by estimating the optimal shares
of intergovernmental transfers to states in Mexico. Our analysis is the first to develop
estimates of intergovernmental transfers by using Paretian distribution functions of the
interregional distribution of income and the interregional distribution of preferences for
local public spending. Our estimates help to understand advantages and shortcomings of
the current system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers and propose an alternati-
ve way to allocate intergovernmental transfers that could improve the welfare associated
with local public spending in Mexico.
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Resumen
Desarrollamos una teoría de transferencias intergubernamentales optimas y un análisis
de simulación que nos permite estimar las transferencias óptimas de recursos del gobierno
central a los gobiernos estatales en México. Nuestros resultados son: Primero, nuestros
modelos demuestran que el mejor predictor de las transferencias intergubernamentales
observadas en México es la densidad poblacional. Segundo, nuestro trabajo provee re-
comendaciones de política económica al proporcionar estimaciones sobre la proporción
óptima de transferencias intergubernamentales a los estados en México. Nuestro análisis
es el primero en desarrollar estimaciones de las transferencias intergubernamentales al
utilizar funciones paramétricas Paretianas de la distribución regional del ingreso y las
preferencias inter-regionales por el gasto público local. Nuestras estimaciones ayudan a
entender las ventajas y desventajas del sistema actual de transferencias y, adicionalmente,
propone una alternativa de asignación de las transferencias intergubernamentales que
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Resumen
podría mejorar el bienestar asociado con el gasto público local en México.
JEL Classification: J01, J23, J24, M51, O31
Keywords: entrepreneurship; global innovation index; human talent; search and matching
with frictions
1. Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that the vast majority of central governments in modern econo-
mies use inter-governmental transfers (monetary transfers from the central government to
subnational governments) to finance goods and services provided by subnational govern-
ments. Intergovernmental transfers are used in modern economies for different reasons:
first, local public goods provided by subnational governments might show positive regio-
nal externalities. In the absence of intergovernmental transfers, local governments might
not recognize the external benefits of local public goods and the provision of local public
goods is not Pareto efficient. The central government can design a system of transfers to
create incentives for local governments to provide Pareto efficient levels of local public
goods (see Boadway 2007).
Second, intergovernmental transfers can be used to redistribute resources and reduce
the inequality in the distribution of access to critical government services for individuals
living in different regions of a country. Subnational governments might have different abi-
lities to provide goods and services to their residents. This might lead to a problem of
horizontal inequality in the access of residents of different localities to goods and servi-
ces provided by sub-national governments such as public education, public security and
health services (see Martinez and Sepulveda 2011). Therefore, a program of intergovern-
mental transfers can redistribute resources from high income to low income localities to
improve the quality and access of critical services from the government in all regions of
the country. Third, intergovernmental transfers can be explained as a mechanism to share
revenue across different subnational governments (see Rao 2007) and to reduce failures of
coordination that could lead to vertical and horizontal tax externalities (see Ponce and
Medina 2018).
In Mexico, the provision of goods and services of sub-national governments is highly
dependent of resources transferred by the central government to state governments. The
evidence shows that, in 2014, the proportion of intergovernmental transfers in relation of
total state public revenues is 84% (similar estimates are found for other years). Accor-
ding to a report of World Bank (2019), the total amount of intergovernmental transfers
in Mexico is approximately 8.1 percent of GDP in 2017. In practice, Mexico uses intergo-
vernmental transfers for different purposes: for instance, the fund of “participaciones” is
a revenue sharing program financed by federal taxes aiming to reduce significant vertical
imbalances (see the report by World Bank 2019).3 Intergovernmental transfers also inclu-
de conditional transfers (through the fund of aportaciones) that finance specific projects
in the areas of health, public security, etc., and discretionary transfers though specific
agreements or convenios to finance the perceived priorities of policy makers in the central
and state governments (see the report by World Bank 2019).
Given the importance of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico, it is relevant to ask:
what should be the optimal distribution of inter-governmental transfers to state govern-
ments in Mexico? The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical model to answer
this question. We also develop a simulation analysis of the implied results of the theory
3A vertical fiscal imbalance corresponds to the difference between the own revenues of a particular
level of government and its expenditures.
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to compare with the observed allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico. Our
analysis shows that the current system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers are
poorly related with the regional inequality in the distribution of income and the regio-
nal heterogeneity of preferences of individuals for local public spending. However, most
analysis on fiscal federalism, consider both, the regional distribution of income and the dis-
tribution of preferences, as important determinants of intergovernmental transfers. Hence,
our analysis provides insights about advantages and shortcomings of the way intergovern-
mental transfers are currently allocated in Mexico. To see this, note that the first insight
of our analysis shows that our model that considers a social welfare function in which all
individuals of all regions receive the same weight in the social welfare function, provides
a surprisingly good fit for the observed shares of transfers from the central government
to states with our simulated results having a correlation of 0.9 with the observed shares
of intergovernmental transfers received by states in Mexico.
Second, if the central government is concerned with the regional inequality of income
then the implied shares of transfers to state governments are significantly different to the
observed allocation of state transfers in Mexico. Altogether these findings suggest that
the observed shares of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico are not fully incorporating
the regional inequality of income. However, our estimates indeed consider the regional
inequality of income in Mexico, and therefore, our estimates provide a complete set of
estimates for transfers to states that could lead to a policy reform that improves the
regional equity of public spending of state governments.
Third, we provide estimates of shares of intergovernmental transfers to state govern-
ments for the case in which policy is concerned about matching the provision of local
public goods with the heterogeneity of preferences of individuals across regions in Mexi-
co. For this case, we also provide exact estimates of the shares of resources that each state
should receive and our analysis reveals opportunities for Pareto efficient improvements in
the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to state governments in Mexico. In summary,
our model identifies prescriptions of policy that could reform the way intergovernmental
transfers are allocated in Mexico. Our policy prescriptions could lead to improvements of
welfare in the Mexican economy related with a more effective subnational public spending.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 introduces our theoretical model. Section 4 considers that the design of intergo-
vernmental transfers seek to maximize a social welfare function that satisfies the proper-
ties of unanimity and symmetry in the allocation of social weights (all states receive the
same social weight in the social welfare function). Section 5 estimates intergovernmental
transfers for the case in which policymakers seek to reduce the regional inequality in the
distribution of income. Section 6 considers social weights associated with the intensity
of preferences for local public goods. Section 7 includes the description of the data and
the simulation analysis that provides estimates of optimal shares of intergovernmental
transfers to state governments. Section 8 presents the results of our simulations. Section
9 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The literature on public economics on intergovernmental transfers can be classified by
normative theories (that seek to study how policies should be designed and implemen-
ted) and positive theories (that study how polices are designed and implemented). One
influential contribution on public finance is the median voter theory which postulates
that government spending and taxation are determined by politicians that seek to win
elections see Meltzer and Richard (1981). In this case, a central and sub-national govern-
ments design the ideal policy of the median voter on government spending and taxation
because that is the policy that maximizes votes in the election. More recently, Hettich
and Winer (2005) criticize the median voter model by pointing out that this model can
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not explain the complexity of modern tax systems and the multi-dimensional aspects of
government spending. They propose a probabilistic voting model that predicts that policy
makers deign tax and spending policies to please different groups in the society. Hence,
governments select the ideal policy of the average voter or a weighted average voter in the
electorate. Some applications to the theory of fiscal federalism from models with electoral
concerns include the analysis of Besley and Coate (2003) who study the role of local and
national legislatures in determining taxing and spending decisions of central and subna-
tional governments and Lockwood (2008) who studies the role of lobbying in explaining
the structure of governments in a federalist economy (for a survey of the political economy
of fiscal federalism see Lockwood 2015). Recent empirical analysis, see Ponce, et al (2018)
and Hankla, Martinez-Vazquez and Ponce-Rodriguez (2019) show worldwide robust evi-
dence that elections and political institutions are important determinants of government
spending in federations.
On the normative theory of fiscal public finance, the landmark theories of optimal
taxation and optimal public spending consider that policy makers should design public
policies to maximize a social welfare function which represents the collective welfare of
society. While designing policy, policy makers, might assign weights to the welfare of indi-
viduals in the social welfare function. These social weights might represent well deserving
objectives that policy makers want to achieve such as an equitable allocation of resources
or concerns about the efficiency in the allocation of resources (see Atkinson and Stiglitz
1972, 1976 and more recently Saez and Stantcheva 2016). The normative analysis has
emphasized that intergovernmental transfers should also be used to redistribute resources
and reduce the inequality in the distribution of access to critical government services for
individuals living in different regions of a country (see Boadway 2007). Subnational go-
vernments might have different abilities to provide goods and services to their residents.
This might lead to a problem of horizontal inequality in the access of residents of diffe-
rent localities to goods and services provided by sub-national governments such as public
education, public security and health services (see Martinez and Sepulveda 2011). Others
have pointed out that intergovernmental transfers should be assigned to achieve an effi-
cient allocation of resources, see Boadway and Shah (2007). Intergovernmental transfers
can also be explained as a mechanism to share revenue across different subnational go-
vernments (see Rao 2007) and to reduce failures of coordination that could lead to vertical
and horizontal tax externalities (see Ponce-Rodriguez and Medina 2018).
Our analysis is a normative theory that allows to identify prescriptions of policy
design by identifying optimal allocations for intergovernmental transfers. Our paper is
different from the literature because we study the role of social weights in the social
welfare function as a determinant of spending and tax policy design. The determination
of weights takes into consideration the objectives of policy design of policy makers. Hence,
the inter-regional allocation of weights might reflect priorities related with anti-poverty
programs, concerns with the regional distribution of income and the efficiency in the
allocation of resources. Hence, our theory contributes to the literature by considering
specific Paretian regional distribution functions of social weights in the social welfare
function and characterizing the optimal amount of intergovernmental transfers to states
when policy makers are concerned about the regional inequality of income and the regional
distribution of heterogeneity of preferences of individuals for local public spending.4
In addition, in this paper we develop a simulation analysis of the implied results our
theory to compare with the observed allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Mexico.
This comparison provides insights about advantages and shortcomings of the way intergo-
4The regional heterogeneity of preferences of individuals for local public goods determine the regional
distribution of social marginal benefits from local public spending and social marginal costs from taxation
that finances government spending. Thus, in the context of a federation, a government that incorporates
the heterogeneity of preferences might lead to an efficient allocation of local public spending.
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vernmental transfers are currently allocated in Mexico. In particular, our analysis shows
that the current system of allocation of intergovernmental transfers are poorly related
with the regional inequality in the distribution of income and the regional heterogeneity
of preferences of individuals for local public spending. However, most analysis on fiscal
federalism, consider both, the regional distribution of income and the distribution of pre-
ferences, as important determinants of intergovernmental transfers. Hence, our analysis
provides insights about advantages and shortcomings of the way intergovernmental trans-
fers are currently allocated in Mexico.
3. The Model
The preferences and budget constraint of a resident living in locality i = 1, 2 . . . .I are
characterized by the utility function of a representative household living in the locality,
µi = xi + βiln(gi), where xi is a private good, gi is a public good provided in locality i
and βi > 0 is a parameter measuring the intensity of preferences for the public good. The
budget constraint of the representative household in locality i is xi = ei(1−τi) where ei is
an endowment and τi is a proportional income tax. The indirect utility of this individual
is given by υi(ei, τi, gi) = ei(1−τi)+βiln(gi). Population in each of the localities is given
by Ni ∀i.
We consider an economy fiscally centralized in which there is a central government
and I local governments. Spending and taxing decisions are determined by the central
government while local governments are simple administrators of the provision of the
public good on their localities. The central government collects tax revenue from all
regions of the country by imposing a uniform proportional income tax τi = τ ∀i and
determines intergovernmental transfers to finance local public goods in all regions. Hence
Ti = gi ∀i where Ti ∀i is the intergovernmental transfer allocated from the central
government to the local government of region i.
The central government selects {Ti}Ii=1 , τ ∀i to maximize a nationwide social welfare
function Ψ =
∑I
i=1 Ψi, which is the sum of utilities of residents of each region and
Ψi = Ni υi(ei, τi, Ti) is the social welfare of region i. In designing policy, the central
government considers the nationwide distribution of social benefits of local public goods
and the nationwide social welfare costs associated with taxation. The government faces
the following trade-offs in the design of intergovernmental transfers: On the one hand,
a marginal increase in the income tax implemented by the central government reduces
private consumption of all residents in the economy. This constitutes a social marginal
cost.
On the other hand, the government collects tax revenue and redistributes resources
in the economy through intergovernmental transfers that finance local public goods in
the economy. This is the social marginal benefit. At equilibrium, the optimal level of
intergovernmental transfers in locality i is where the social marginal benefit of increasing
local public spending in locality i is equal to the social marginal costs of taxation. The
other trade-off for policy design is that the central government allocates resources through
intergovernmental transfers taking into account that 1$ allocated in locality i has an
opportunity cost equivalent to the marginal benefits of local public goods in neighbour
localities.
Hence the problem of tax and intergovernmental transfer policy design is given by:
Max {Ti}Ii=1 ,τ Ψ =
I∑
i=1
ΦiΨi (1)
s.t : i) Ψi = Ni υi(ei, τi, gi) (2)
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ii)
I∑
i=1
Ti = τ
I∑
i=1
Niei (3)
iii) Ti = gi ∀i (4)
Equation (1) is the nationwide social welfare which is the sum of the weighted social
welfare functions of each localities Ψi ∀i. In equation (1), Φi ≥ 0 is the social marginal
utility of the representative household living in locality i. This social weight shows the
importance of a household living in locality i with endowment ei in the society, and
therefore, it might reflect concerns (or tastes) of the policy maker over inter-regional
income inequality and the inter-regional heterogeneity of preference for local public goods.
Equation (3) is the budget constraint of the central government, the left hand side is the
total amount of intergovernmental transfers allocated to all subnational governments and
the right hand side are the public revenues of the central government. Equation (4) says
that the intergovernmental transfers of the central government finances local public goods
in all localities.
In what follows, we characterize the equilibrium level of inter-governmental transfers
of the central government to subnational governments i = 1, 2 . . . I.
Proposition 1. The optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers to sub-
national government in locality i is given by
T ∗i = ΦiNiβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei
}
∀i (5)
Proof.
See appendix 1.
Proposition 1 says that the optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers that
finances local public spending in locality i depends positively on the country’s aggregate
income,
∑I
i=1Niei , and the marginal social utility of local public spending on locality
i, ΦiNiβi, and negatively on the country’s weighted aggregate income
∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei. The
higher the country’s aggregate income the higher the tax revenue of the central govern-
ment and the higher the intergovernmental transfers that finance public spending in all
localities (including locality i). The higher the weighted aggregate income,
∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei,
the higher the social marginal costs from income taxation and the lower is public spending
in the whole country (including locality i). The higher the social marginal utility of public
spending on locality i, ΦiNiβi, the higher the social marginal benefits of spending in the
locality and the higher is T ∗i . Note, that increases in the social marginal utility of residents
of locality i in the social welfare of the central government, Φi, in the size of population of
the locality i,Ni, and the intensity of preferences for public goods, βi, lead to increases in
the marginal social utility of public spending on locality i, and consequently, in increases
in intergovernmental transfers in the locality.
4. Social Weights and the Regional Allocation of Inter-Governmental
Transfers
In this section, we analyse how the allocation of social weights determine the regional
distribution of inter-governmental transfers and local public spending. The allocation of
social weights in the social welfare function might be explained by preferences (or con-
cerns) of policy makers over regional inequality, the distribution of regional preferences of
citizens over local public goods, the regional distribution of population, etc. Even other
incentives such as electoral concerns and political ideology might affect the allocation of
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social weights, the regional distribution of intergovernmental transfers and the regional
distribution of public spending.
In what follows, proposition 2 characterizes our benchmark outcome in which all hou-
seholds of all localities receive the same weight in the social welfare function of the central
government. That is, Φi = Φj = Φ ∀i 6= j. This case reflects a symmetry in the way hou-
seholds, living in different regions, are treated by the central government. In this case, the
social welfare function of the central government is considered to satisfy the unanimity
and symmety properties in which all households have the same marginal social utility.5
Proposition 2. If Φi = Φj = Φ ∀i 6= j then the optimal allocation of
inter-governmental transfers is given by
T ∗i = Niβi ∀i (6)
Proof.
Result follows trivially from proposition 1.
Proposition 2 says that if the central government assigns the same weight to the wel-
fare of all individuals in the economy in the social welfare function from then the optimal
allocation of inter-governmental transfers that finances local public spending in all locali-
ties depend only on the regional distribution of social marginal benefits of local spending
in each locality, Niβi. That is to say, localities with higher than average marginal utility
of government spending should receive higher than average intergovernmental transfers.
In this economy, localities with higher than average population and higher than average
preferences for local public goods should receive higher than average transfers and the
size of local public spending should also be higher than the nationwide average.
5. Inter-Regional Income Inequality, Social Weights with Equity
Concerns and Government Spending
The policy maker might be concerned about the inter-regional inequality of income. This
might be an issue of main concern for policy design because different regions might have
different incomes and therefore different capacities to provide local public goods such as
public infrastructure, education, health services and other important tasks in which the
government is involved. Hence, wealthy regions might be able to afford essential public
spending that affects positively the welfare of their residents while poor regions would be
constrained to have access to local resources to finance public spending. This, in turn, will
lead to an unequal distribution of local public spending and welfare of residents in the
economy. For this reason, a policy maker might assign priorities on the regional allocation
of inter-governmental transfers to design an equalization transfer policy in which wealthy
regions redistribute income to poor regions.
More relevant for our analysis, is that the policy maker in the central government could
have a taste for the regional inequality of income. This “taste” corresponds to the personal
view of the policy maker of the central government over the issue of the regional inequality
of income in the economy. For instance, the policy maker in the central government might
believe that one of the objectives of designing intergovernmental transfers is to maximize
the redistribution of welfare of individuals living in different regions. Such a personal view
of the policy maker in the central government would imply a very particular set of social
weights in the social welfare function in which localities with low income receive a high
social weight in the social welfare function. In this case, the regional equitable distribution
of income would be a clear objective in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers.
5This social welfare function is said to be symmetric because all households have the same marginal
social utility in the social welfare function.
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One way to do so, is to assign specific weights to the regional distribution of marginal
benefits of public spending. To do so, a policy maker could assign weights according to
a Paretian distribution of income in which localities with low income might be assigned
a high social weight in the social welfare function (see figure 1). In particular, the policy
maker might assign weights that are inversely related to income in the locality. To charac-
terize such possibility, we define eimin = Min {e1, e2 . . . . . . eI} therefore eimin represents
the lowest income in the economy. The allocation of social weights in the social welfare
function of the government motivated by inter-regional equity concerns is given as follows
(see figure 1):
Φi =

eimin
ei
∀ei ≥ eimin
0 ∀ ei < eimin
(7)
Figure 1. Paretian Distribution of Income
In condition (7), the policy maker assigns weights that are inversely related to income
in the locality. Those localities with lower than average income have a social marginal
utility (a social weight Φi) higher than the average nationwide social marginal utility in the
welfare function of the central government. Proposition 3 characterizes the distribution
of intergovernmental transfers for the case policy design seeks to reduce the regional
inequality of income.
Proposition 3. If the allocation of social weights is determined by equity
concerns about the inter-regional distribution of income such that
Φi =

eimin
ei
∀ei ≥ eimin
0 ∀ ei < eimin
Then the optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers is denoted by T ∗iP
such that
T ∗iP = Niβi
{
Ef (ei)
ei
}
∀i (8)
Where Ef (ei) =
∑I
i=1 fiei is a weighted average of per capita income in
locality i, and fi is the density of population in locality i over the nationwide
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population such that
fi ∈ (0, 1] : fi = Ni∑I
i=1Ni
∧
I∑
i=1
fi = 1 (9)
Proof.
See the appendix.
If the policy maker is concerned with the interregional inequality of income then the
allocation of transfers for locality i depend on the aggregate intensity of preferences in
locality i, Niβi, which in turn depends positively on the population of the locality, Ni,
and the intensity of preferences of locality i over local public goods βi. The transfer in
each locality also depends positively on the relative measure of weighted income in the
country and the income of locality i, Ef (ei)ei , the higher the income in the locality i, in
relation of the weighted nationwide average income, the lower the transfer in the locality.
Proposition 4 makes a comparative analysis of the distribution of transfers to locality
i for the case in which the social weights reflect that the policy maker assigns the same
social weight to all households, that is T ∗i , and for the case in which the policy maker has
concerns about an equitable inter-regional allocation of resources in the country, T ∗iP .
Proposition 4. If the allocation of social weights is determined by an Inter-
Regional Paretian distribution of income given by
Φi =

eimin
ei
∀ei ≥ eimin
0 ∀ ei < eimin
And if a locality i satisfies
ei ≤ Ef (ei) then T ∗iP ≥ T ∗i (10)
Proof.
This outcome follows trivially from propositions one and three.
Proposition 4 shows that if the allocation of social weights in policy design is not
trivial. In particular, proposition 4 shows that if the policy maker is concerned about
the inter-regional inequality of welfare of citizens then those localities with incomes that
are lower to the socially weighted income Ef (ei) will receive higher transfers relative the
situation in which all households have the same inter-regional social weight in the social
welfare function, that is to say, if ei ≤ Ef (ei) then T ∗iP ≥ T ∗i .
6. Social Weights According to the Inter-Regional Distribution of
Preferences and Intergovernmental Transfers
Policy makers might have preferences (or might be concerned) about the inter-regional
heterogeneity of preferences. This might be an issue of main concern for policy makers
because different regions might have different intensities of preferences for local public
goods. Optimal inter-governmental transfers are required to recognize the regional inten-
sity of preferences for local public spending. To see this, note that localities with residents
with higher than average marginal utilities from public spending (in our model, localities
with higher than average values of βi) will also have higher than average social margi-
nal benefits from public spending. An optimal allocation of intergovernmental transfers
requires that the higher is the marginal utility of public spending in the locality the
higher should be the transfer to that locality, otherwise, local public spending would be
sub-optimal.
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As we mentioned before, also relevant for our analysis is that the policy maker in the
central government could have a taste for the heterogeneity of preferences of individuals
for subnational spending. This “taste” corresponds to the personal view of the policy
maker of the central government over the issue of the heterogeneity of preferences for
subnational public spending in the economy. For instance, the policy maker in the central
government might believe that the provision of public goods should be uniform across
localities. Such a personal view of the policy maker in the central government would
imply a very particular set of social weights in the social welfare function, however, such
prescription of policy might not be socially optimal for the general case of the problem
of the allocation of intergovernmental transfers.
Another possibility is that the policy maker wants to make the most efficient decisions
in designing policy in the central government. Therefore, localities with high social mar-
ginal benefits from public spending could receive a high social weigh in the social welfare
function. In this case, maximizing the regional net fiscal incidence of public goods (the
net gains from government intervention) would be a clear objective in the allocation of
intergovernmental transfers. The net fiscal incidence reflects the society’s surplus from
government intervention and recognizes the next economic tradeoff: on the one hand, a
marginal increase in the income tax implemented by the central government reduces pri-
vate consumption of all residents in the economy. This constitutes a social marginal cost.
On the other hand, the government collects tax revenue and redistributes resources in
the economy through intergovernmental transfers that finances local public goods in the
economy. This is the social marginal benefit.
Hence, the net fiscal incidence is the net benefit-cost analysis from government in-
tervention and represents the society’s economic surplus (the sum of the consumer’s and
producer’s surplus). By assigning social weights to the social welfare function, the policy
maker is assigning weights to the net fiscal incidence of localities. Therefore, different
weights to the net fiscal incidence of government intervention in each locality will lead
to different levels of nationwide social welfare. For instance, if the policy maker assigns a
high weight to localities with high net fiscal incidence then the nationwide welfare would
be higher relative the alternative in which the policy maker assigns a high weight to
localities with low net fiscal incidence.
Taking into account the regional distribution of net fiscal incidence of government in-
tervention, policy makers can assign weights that are positively related with the intensity
of preferences in each locality, that is to say, localities with high net fiscal incidence from
local public goods should be assigned a high social weight in the social welfare function (see
equation 10). To characterize such possibility, we define the locality with the highest pa-
rameter of intensity of preferences for public spending by βimax = Max {β1, β2 . . . . . . βI}.
In this case, the allocation of weights for each locality Φi satisfies the following:
Φi =

βi
βimax
∀ βi ≤ βimax
0 ∀ βi > βimax
(11)
We also define, Eh (βi) =
∑I
i=1 hiβi, as the nationwide weighted average of the para-
meter of intensity of preferences βi and hi (ei) as the share of income in locality i over
the nationwide income, satisfying:
hi (ei) ∈ (0, 1] : hi (ei) = Niei∑I
i=1Niei
∧
I∑
i=1
hi (ei) = 1 (12)
In what follows, proposition 5 characterizes the size of inter-governmental transfers
T ∗iβ for the case in which social weights are assigned to incorporate the heterogeneity of
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preferences over local public spending and proposition 6 compares T ∗iβ with the case in
which the policy maker assigns the same social weight to all households, that is, T ∗i .
Proposition 5. If the allocation of social weights is determined by an inter-
regional Paretian distribution of preferences given by
Φi =

βi
βimax
∀ βi ≤ βimax
0 ∀ βi > βimax
Then the optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers is denoted by T ∗iβ
such that
T ∗iβ = Niβi
{
βi
Eh (βi)
}
∀i (13)
Where Eh (βi) =
∑I
i=1 hiβi, is the nationwide weighted average of the para-
meter of intensity of preferences for localities and
hi (ei) ∈ (0, 1] : hi (ei) = Niei∑I
i=1Niei
∧
I∑
i=1
hi (ei) = 1 (14)
Proof.
See the appendix.
Proposition 5, says that for the case in which the inter-regional heterogeneity of prefe-
rences for local public goods determines the allocation of social weights Φi, the distribution
of inter-governmental transfers T ∗iβ depends positively on the aggregate intensity of pre-
ferences in locality i, Niβi, and on the ratio of the parameter of intensity of preferences
of locality i in relation to the nationwide average intensity of preferences in the economy
given by βiEh(βi) .
Proposition 6 compares T ∗iβ with the case in which the policy maker assigns the same
social weight to all households, that is, T ∗i .
Proposition 6. If the allocation of social weights is determined by an Inter-
regional Paretian distribution of preferences given by
Φi =

βi
βimax
∀ βi ≤ βimax
0 ∀ βi > βimax
And if a locality i satisfies
βi ≥ Eh (βi) then T ∗iβ ≥ T ∗i (15)
Proof.
This outcome follows by comparing T ∗iβ from proposition 5 and T
∗
i from pro-
position 2.
Proposition 6 shows that if the policy maker is concerned about the inter-regional
heterogeneity of preferences for local public spending then those localities with values of
βi that are higher to the weighted value of the intensity of preferences for local public
spending Eh (βi) =
∑I
i=1 hiβi will receive higher transfers relative the situation in which
all households have the same inter-regional social weight in the social welfare function,
that is to say, if βi ≥ Eh (βi) then T ∗iβ ≥ T ∗i .
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7. Simulations and Estimates of Optimal Shares of Inter-Governmental
Transfers
Our theory makes predictions over the size and regional distribution of intergovernmental
transfers. In particular, table 1 shows predictions of our theory for the optimal allocation
of inter-governmental transfers (see column B of table 1) and its implied shares of intergo-
vernmental transfers in relation to the total amount of resources devoted from the central
government to state governments (see column C of table 1). The shares of intergovern-
mental transfers are defined as follows, consider T ∗i as the amount of inter-governmental
transfers allocated by the central government to the government of state i. The share of
inter-governmental transfers in the state is given by s∗i =
T∗i∑I
i=1 T
∗
i
where
∑I
i=1 T
∗
i is the
total amount of resources devoted from the central government to state governments.6
Based on our theoretical model, we provide estimates for the size and regional distri-
bution of shares of intergovernmental transfers to state governments for the cases in which
the central government is concerned about the regional inequality in the distribution of
income and the regional heterogeneity of preferences for local public goods. We also pro-
vide estimates for the case in which the social welfare function satisfies the properties of
unanimity and symmetry (all social weights are the same).
For the analysis of simulation, we use data for intergovernmental transfers, T ∗i , as
the sum of “participaciones” and “aportaciones” from the central government to state
governments for year 2014, the state population in locality i for year 2014 (which is Ni),
the real state gross domestic product of locality i for year 2014 (which in our model is ei),
and for the parameter of intensity of preferences we use the proportion of women with
superior education for year 2014 (women with a college degree). Empirical evidence shows
that the characteristics of population in the locality matter to determine the demand of
local public spending. In particular, the larger the proportion of women and the larger
the education of residents the higher is the demand for public spending, see Ferris (1983),
Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1982), Holsey and Borcherding (1997), among
many others. Hence we use the proportion of women with a college degree in state i as
a proxi of taste for goods and services provided by the state government. The higher
the proportion of women with college degree the higher the intensity of preferences for
goods and services from the government and the higher the demand for subnational
public spending. The source of our data is Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e
Informatica (INEGI).
6It is worth mentioning that there is not a single formula for the allocation of the total amount of
intergovernmental transfers due to the design of the fund of “participaciones” is different from the program
of “aportaciones. In practice, intergovernmental transfers are used in Mexico for different purposes: for
instance, the fund of “participaciones” is a revenue sharing program financed by federal taxes. According to
a report from the Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Publicas (2017), the general fund of “participaciones”
uses a linear weighted formula to distribute resources to states that takes into consideration the growth
of the general fund of “participaciones”, the evolution of gross domestic product of each locality over
time, and the evolution of tax revenue collection over time in each locality. It is important to recall that
Intergovernmental transfers can also be discretionary transfers though specific agreements or convenios
to finance the perceived priorities of policy makers in the central and state governments and therefore
these funds are allocated in a discretionary form.
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Table 1. Optimal Inter-Governmental Transfers and Optimal Shares of
Inter-Governmental Transfers.
Principles of Policy Design Social Weights(A)
Optimal Transfers
and Government
Spending, T ∗i
(B)
Shares of Inter-
Governmental
Transfers,
s∗i =
T∗i∑I
i=1 T
∗
i
(C)
Unanimity and
Symmetry
(equal weights)
Φi = Φj = Φ ∀i 6= j T ∗i = Niβi s∗i = Niβi∑I
i=1Niβi
Regional
Inequality of
Income
Φi =

eimin
ei
∀ei ≥ eimin
0 ∀ ei < eimin
T ∗iP =
NiβiEf (ei)
ei
s∗iP =
Niβi
ei∑I
i=1
Niβi
ei
Regional
Heterogeneity
of Preferences
Φi =

βi
βimax
∀ βi ≤ βimax
0 ∀ βi > βimax
T ∗iβ =
Ni(βi)
2
Eh(βi)
s∗iβ =
Ni(βi)
2∑I
i=1Ni(βi)
2
In what follows, figure two shows the distributional allocation of state gross domestic
product for Mexico for year 2014, figure three the state distributions of regional hetero-
geneity of preferences for year 2014, and figure four the state population for year 2014.
Figure 2. State Gross Domestic Product in Mexico, 2014 (Millions of pesos).
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Figure 3. Percentage of Women With College Education, 2014.
Figure 4. Percentage of Women With College Education, 2014.
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8. Results
In this section, we present the results of our estimations based on our theoretical model.
In the appendix we show a summary of all of our simulations (see table 5). Figure 5 and
6 show the observed share of inter-governmental transfers and the estimated shares of
intergovernmental transfers for the case in which policy makers use social weights given
by Φi = Φj = Φ ∀i 6= j. In this case, the social welfare function of the central government
is considered to satisfy the unanimity and symmetric properties in which all households
have the same marginal social utility. Our estimates of the shares of inter-governmental
transfers are given by s∗i =
Niβi∑I
i=1Niβi
(see table 1). As figure 6 shows, the estimates from
the theoretical model are surprisingly close to the observed intergovernmental transfers
received by states in 2014. The correlation between the real shares and our estimates
assuming weights of the social welfare reflecting the principles of unanimity and symmetry
is 0.9. However, we estimate the shares of intergovernmental transfers using only the
regional density of population and assuming that all individuals in all regions have the
same preferences for public spending. These estimates have a correlation with the observed
data of 0.98. This means that the best fit of our model to observed data suggests that the
best predictor of the share of intergovernmental transfers to states is the regional density
of population in Mexico.
Figure 5. Real and Estimated Shares of Inter-Governmental Transfers by State When
Social Weights Reflect Principles of Unanimity and Symmetry
Table 2 shows the main winners and losers from a change in the allocation of intergo-
vernmental transfers from the current system towards using social weights in the social
welfare function satisfying the unanimity and symmetry properties in which all households
have the same marginal social utility are Ciudad de Mexico, Estado de Mexico, Jalisco,
and Nuevo Leon with gains in percentage points of 5.87 1.63, 1.20, and 1.11 of the total
amount of resources devoted to intergovernmental transfers (see table 2).7 Clearly, the
gains would be concentrated in Ciudad de Mexico and these gains would come to the ex-
pense of several states that would receive less intergovernmental transfers. In particular,
7That is to say, the observed share of intergovernmental transfers received by Ciudad de Mexico in
2014 were 6.74% while the corresponding share of intergovernmental transfers received by Ciudad de
Mexico if social weights satisfy the properties of unanimity and symmetry is 12.61%. this represents a
gain of 5.87 in percentage points of the total amount of resources devoted to intergovernmental transfers.
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the states that would lose intergovernmental transfers would be Chiapas (with a loss of
2.45 percentage points), Oaxaca (with a loss of 1.98 percentage points), Guerrero (with
a loss of 1.58 percentage points) and Michoacan (with a loss of 0.99 percentage points),
Guanajuanto (with a loss of 0.92 percentage points) and Tabasco (with a loss of 0.78
percentage points).
Table 2. Winners and Loser from the Current System Towards a Change of Social
Weights Satisfying Unanimity and Symmetry Treatment from the Central Government
State
Social Weights
with Unanimity
and Symmetry
Real Share
of Intergov
Transfers
Gain State
Social Weights
with Unanimity
and Symmetry
Real Share
of Intergov
Transfers
Loss
Ciudad de México 12.61 6.74 5.87 Chiapas 2.60 5.05 -2.45
Estado de México 13.41 11.73 1.68 Oaxaca 2.07 3.98 -1.91
Jalisco 6.65 5.45 1.20 Guerrero 2.13 3.70 -1.58
Nuevo León 5.31 4.21 1.11 Michoacán 2.78 3.77 -0.99
Baja California 3.08 2.29 0.79 Guanajuato 3.43 4.35 -0.92
Coahuila 2.82 2.34 0.48 Tabasco 1.97 2.74 -0.78
Figure 7 shows the observed shares of inter-governmental transfers and the estimated
shares of intergovernmental transfers for the case in which policy makers are concerned
with the regional inequality in the distribution of state income. In this case, our estimates
of the shares of inter-governmental transfers are given by s∗iP =
Niβi
ei∑I
i=1
Niβi
ei
(see table
1). Figure 7 shows several aspects that are relevant to point out: first, the estimates
from the theoretical model are undoubtedly different to the observed intergovernmental
transfers received by states in 2014. The average estimated share of intergovernmental
transfers to be received by state governments for the case social weights reflect concerns
over inequality of income is 3.30 and the variance of the distribution is 0.83. In contrast,
the observed share of transfers received by state governments is 3.32 and the variance of
the distribution is 5.01.
The difference in the variance between the observed and estimated shares means that a
change towards using social weights determined according to a concern of policy makers
with the regional inequality of income leads to a more equitable allocation of intergo-
vernmental transfers across regions. Second, the correlation between the real shares and
the estimates assuming weights of the social welfare reflect concerns about the regional
inequality in the distribution of income is 0.24.
What this means, is that policy makers in Mexico does not seem to incorporate (in a
significant way) the regional inequality in the distribution of state income in the allocation
of inter-governmental transfers to state governments. If policy makers were to consider
the regional inequality of income the observed transfers would have less variability over
localities.
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Figure 6. Real and Estimated Shares of Inter-Governmental Transfers by State When
Social Weights Reflect Concerns About the Regional Inequality of Income
Table 3 shows the main winners and losers from a change in the allocation of intergo-
vernmental transfers from the current system towards using social weights in the social
welfare function according to a concern of policy makers with the regional inequality of
income. The states with the gains in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers are
Tlaxcala, Nayarit, Colima, Morelos, Baja California Sur and Yucatan with gains in per-
centage points, respectively, of 3.72, 3.28, 2.70, 2.39, 2.09 and 1.63 of the total amount of
resources for intergovernmental transfers.
Table 3. Winners and Losers from a Change from the Current System Towards Social
Weights Considering the Regional Inequality of Income
State
Social Weights
Based on Inequality
of Income
Real Share
of Intergov
Transfers
Gain State
Social Weights
Based on Inequality
of Income
Real Share
of Intergov
Transfers
Loss
Tlaxcala 4.87 1.15 3.72 Estado deMéxico 4.31 11.73 -7.42
Nayarit 4.50 1.22 3.28 Ciudad deMéxico 2.09 6.74 -4.65
Colima 3.52 0.83 2.70 Veracruz 3.27 6.19 -2.92
Morelos 3.93 1.54 2.39 Jalisco 2.83 5.45 -2.62
Baja California
Sur 2.89 0.80 2.09 Nuevo León 2.07 4.21 -2.14
Yucatán 3.43 1.80 1.63 Guanajuato 2.50 4.35 -1.85
The states that would lose from a change towards using social weights in a social
welfare function according to a concern of policy makers with the regional inequality of
income are Estado de Mexico (with a loss of 7.42 percentage points), Ciudad de Mexico
(with a loss of 4.65 percentage points), Veracruz (with a loss of 3.27 percentage points),
Jalisco (with a loss of 2.67 percentage points), Nuevo León (with a loss of 2.14 percentage
points), and Guanajuato (with a loss of 1.85 percentage points).
Figure 8 shows the observed shares of inter-governmental transfers and the estimated
shares of intergovernmental transfers for the case in which policy makers are concerned
with the regional heterogeneity of preferences. That is to say, policy makers could assign
weights that are positively related to localities with high marginal social benefits from
local public goods and low marginal social costs from taxation.
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Figure 7. Real and Estimated Shares of Inter-Governmental Transfers by State When
Social Weights Reflect Concerns About the Regional Heterogeneity of Preferences
In this case, our estimates of the shares of inter-governmental transfers are given by
s∗iβ =
Ni(βi)
2∑I
i=1Ni(βi)
2 (see table 1). Figure 8 also shows that the distribution of intergovern-
mental transfers leads to more variance in the regional distribution of intergovernmental
transfers and concentrates the gains in Ciudad de Mexico. The average share of transfers
received by state governments is 2.85 and the variance of the distribution is 14.77 and the
observed share of transfers received by state governments is 3.32 and the variance of the
distribution is 5.01. Furthermore, the correlation between the real shares and the estima-
tes (assuming weights of the social welfare reflect concerns about the regional inequality
in the distribution of income) is 0.72.
Table 4. Winners and Loser from the Current System Towards a Change of Social
Weights Considering Regional Heterogeneity
State
Shares of
Inter-Gov
Transfers Under
Heterogeneity of
Preferences
Real Share of
Intergovernmental
Transfers
Gain State
Shares of
Inter-Gov
Transfers Under
Heterogeneity of
Preferences
Real Share of
Intergovernmental
Transfers
Loss
Ciudad de
México 20.12 6.74 13.38 Chiapas 1.46 5.05 -3.59
Nuevo León 6.30 4.21 2.10 Oaxaca 1.21 3.98 -2.78
Sinaloa 3.82 2.78 1.04 Guerrero 1.43 3.70 -2.28
Jalisco 6.32 5.45 0.87 Guanajuato 2.29 4.35 -2.06
Baja California 3.08 2.29 0.79 Michoacán 1.90 3.77 -1.87
Coahuila 3.05 2.34 0.71 Veracruz 4.59 6.19 -1.60
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9. Conclusion
Modern economies use intergovernmental transfers to help finance important goods and
services provided by subnational governments such as education, health services, infras-
tructure and anti-poverty programs. The normative literature of public economics has
emphasized that intergovernmental transfers should be designed to alleviate problems
of regional inequality and inefficiency in the allocation of resources. The literature on
optimal taxation and spending has also pointed out that resources should be allocated
to the highest economic returns and therefore the regional heterogeneity of preferences
of individuals for local public spending should also be a principle of policy design in
intergovernmental transfers.
In this paper we develop an optimal theory of intergovernmental transfers which pro-
vides specific rules for shares of resources of intergovernmental transfers to be assigned
to state governments in Mexico. Based on this theory, we develop a simulation analysis
that provides estimates about the optimal shares of resources to be allocated to state
governments assuming that policy makers might have objectives such as minimizing the
regional inequality of income and maximizing social welfare by matching local public
spending with the heterogeneous regional preferences of individuals.
Our analysis provides interesting insights about the regional distribution of intergo-
vernmental transfers in Mexico: the best fit of our model to observed data suggests that
policy makers could use a social welfare function that satisfies the properties of anonymity
and symmetry (all states receive the same social weight in the social welfare function).
Our estimates also suggest that the best predictor of the share of intergovernmental trans-
fers is the density of population in Mexico. This has the important implication that policy
makers in Mexico do not fully incorporate the heterogeneity of preferences for goods and
services provided by subnational governments and the regional inequality of income in
the design of intergovernmental transfers.
However, our model suggests that incorporating these objectives of policy would lead
to a different allocation of intergovernmental transfers that would represent a Pareto im-
provement in the allocation of public resources in the Mexican economy. In this paper, we
provide estimates of optimal shares of intergovernmental transfers for state governments
that take into account the heterogeneity of preferences for goods and services and the
regional inequality of income in the design of intergovernmental transfers.
Our analysis also represents a proposal for policy reform in the allocation of intergo-
vernmental transfers. In this paper we have assumed that policy makers want to maximize
a social welfare function and therefore this paper contributes in pointing out feasible po-
licy reforms that could lead to Pareto improvements. However, politicians and bureaucrats
(who are in charge of the design and implementation of policy) might not seek to design
policy to maximize the society’s welfare but to benefit groups of interest or to maximize
votes in elections. In that sense, the policy prescriptions described in this paper might
not be aligned with political realities and electoral incentives. An interesting avenue for
future research is to extend this analysis considering a modern political economy view
that could also point out towards political feasibility in policy design.
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Appendix.
Proposition 1. The optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers to subnational
government in locality i is given by
T ∗i = ΦiNiβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei
}
∀i (A.1)
Proof.
The problem of policy design can be stated as follows:
δ =
∑I
i=1 ΦiNi {ei(1− τ) + βiln(Ti)} + λ
{
τ
∑I
i=1Niei −
∑I
i=1 Ti
}
(A.2)
Where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions are:
∂δ
∂Ti
= ΦiNiβiT∗i
− λ∗ = 0 ∀ T ∗i > 0 (A.3)
∂δ
∂τ = −
∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei + λ
∗∑I
i=1Niei = 0 ∀ τ∗ > 0 (A.4)
∂δ
∂λ = τ
∗∑I
i=1Niei −
∑I
i=1 T
∗
i = 0 ∀ λ∗ > 0 (A.5)
Re-arrange the first order conditions to show that
T ∗i = ΦiNiβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei
}
∀i (A.6)
Proposition 3. If the allocation of social weights is determined by equity concerns about
the inter-regional distribution of income such that
Φi =

eimin
ei
∀ei ≥ eimin
0 ∀ ei < eimin
(A.7)
Then the optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers is denoted by T ∗iP such that
T ∗iP = Niβi
{
Ef (ei)
ei
}
∀i (A.8)
And Ef (ei) =
∑I
i=1 fiei is a weighted average of per capita income in locality i, and fi
is the density of population in locality i over the nationwide population such that
fi ∈ (0, 1] : fi = Ni∑I
i=1Ni
∧ ∑Ii=1 fi = 1 (A.9)
Proof.
From proposition 1, the optimal level of inter-governmental transfers is given by:
T ∗i = ΦiNiβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei
}
∀i (A.10)
If priorities on policy are determined social weights that reflect a concern over the inter-
regional inequality of income such that
Φi =

eimin
ei
∀ei ≥ eimin
0 ∀ ei < eimin
(A.11)
Then use Φi = eiminei ∀i to show T ∗iP is given by:
T ∗iP =
eimin
ei
Niβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1
{
eimin
ei
}
Niei
}
∀i (A.12)
⇒ T ∗iP = Niβiei
{∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1Ni
}
∀i (A.13)
We define fi as the density of population in locality i over the nationwide population such
that
fi ∈ (0, 1] : fi = Ni∑I
i=1Ni
∧ ∑Ii=1 fi = 1 (A.14)
And define the weighted average of per capita income in locality i, by Ef (ei), where
Ef (ei) =
∑I
i=1 fiei (A.15)
Then express T ∗iP as follows:
T ∗iP = Niβi
{
Ef (ei)
ei
}
∀i (A.16)
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Proposition 5. If the allocation of social weights is determined by an Inter-Regional
Paretian distribution of preferences given by
Φi =

βi
βimax
∀ βi ≤ βimax
0 ∀ βi > βimax
Then the optimal allocation of inter-governmental transfers is denoted by T ∗iβ such that
T ∗iβ = Niβi
{
βi
Eh(βi)
}
∀i (A.17)
Where Eh (βi) =
∑I
i=1 hiβi, is the nationwide weighted average of the parameter of in-
tensity of preferences βi and
hi (ei) ∈ (0, 1] : hi (ei) = Niei∑I
i=1Niei
(A.18)
Proof.
From proposition 1, the optimal level of inter-governmental transfers is given by:
T ∗i = T
∗
i = ΦiNiβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1 ΦiNiei
}
∀i (A.19)
If priorities on policy are determined social weights that reflect a concern over the inter-
regional distribution of preferences for local public spending such that
Φi =

βi
βimax
∀ βi ≤ βimax
0 ∀ βi > βimax
(A.20)
Then use Φi = βiEmax(βi) ∀i to show T ∗iβ is given by:
T ∗iβ =
βi
βimax
Niβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1
{
βi
βimax
}
Niei
}
∀i (A.21)
Equivalent to
T ∗iβ = βiN iβi
{ ∑I
i=1Niei∑I
i=1 βiNiei
}
∀i (A.22)
Note that we can define hi (ei) as the share of income in locality i over the nationwide
income, in the following way:
hi (ei) ∈ (0, 1] : hi (ei) = Niei∑I
i=1Niei
∧ ∑Ii=1 hi (ei) = 1 (A.23)
And define Eh (βi) as the nationwide weighted average of the parameter of intensity of
preferences βi such that.
Eh (βi) =
∑I
i=1 hiβi (A.24)
Use the former condition in T∗iβtoshow :
T ∗iβ = Niβi
{
βi
Eh(βi)
}
∀i (A.25)
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Table 5. Shares of Intergovernmental Transfers, Estimates of Simulation Analysis
Entidad
Real (Observed)
Share of
Intergovernmental
Transfers
Social Weights
Considering
Unanimity
and Symmetry
Social Weights
Considering
Inequality
of Income
Social Weights
Considering
Heterogeneity
of Preferences
Aguascalientes 1,19 1,18 2,80 1,24
Baja California 2,29 3,08 2,93 3,08
Baja California Sur 0,80 0,74 2,89 0,81
Campeche 1,16 0,80 0,52 0,79
Coahuila 2,34 2,82 2,26 3,05
Colima 0,83 0,73 3,52 0,84
Chiapas 5,05 2,60 3,98 1,46
Chihuahua 3,10 3,15 2,92 3,03
Ciudad de México 6,74 12,61 2,09 20,12
Durango 1,80 1,33 3,11 1,14
Guanajuato 4,35 3,43 2,50 2,29
Guerrero 3,70 2,13 4,19 1,43
Hidalgo 2,49 1,97 3,71 1,53
Jalisco 5,45 6,65 2,83 6,32
Edo. de México 11,73 13,41 4,31 12,10
Michoacán 3,77 2,78 3,28 1,90
Morelos 1,54 1,60 3,93 1,51
Nayarit 1,22 1,09 4,50 1,10
Nuevo León 4,21 5,31 2,07 6,30
Oaxaca 3,98 2,07 3,74 1,21
Puebla 5,11 4,60 3,96 3,86
Querétaro 1,63 1,87 2,44 1,98
Quintana Roo 1,43 1,32 2,56 1,28
San Luis Potosí 2,25 2,11 3,02 1,83
Sinaloa 2,78 3,17 4,20 3,82
Sonora 2,62 2,90 2,53 3,26
Tabasco 2,74 1,97 1,58 1,84
Tamaulipas 2,80 3,09 2,91 3,05
Tlaxcala 1,15 0,98 4,87 0,85
Veracruz 6,19 5,72 3,27 4,59
Yucatán 1,80 1,70 3,43 1,54
Zacatecas 1,78 1,09 3,14 0,85
Average 3,33 3,14 3,31 2,85
Variance 5,02 8,84 0,83 14,78
